User:0x20545446 - Revision history

0x20545446: a bunch of half finished ideas and a summary paragraph at the top;

2013-09-06T21:03:53Z

a bunch of half finished ideas and a summary paragraph at the top;

0x20545446: trying to figure out a next step for this page;

2013-09-06T20:19:19Z

trying to figure out a next step for this page;

0x20545446 at 20:03, 6 September 2013

2013-09-06T20:03:35Z

0x20545446: added more structure, descriptive text, and "about me" section w/ bmail address;

2013-09-06T19:44:15Z

added more structure, descriptive text, and "about me" section w/ bmail address;

0x20545446 at 03:00, 6 September 2013

2013-09-06T03:00:55Z

0x20545446 at 02:57, 6 September 2013

2013-09-06T02:57:55Z

0x20545446: Created page with "== Thoughts == Protocol Goals"

2013-09-06T02:16:50Z

Created page with "== Thoughts == Protocol Goals"

New page

== Thoughts ==

[[Protocol Goals]]

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 You can reach me at BM-2DB621eNPkjJi3MMpSTqE3YvqKxnz8ZAji
-Note:  If there is a paper or proof showing the Bitmessage protocol is immune from man-in-the-middle attacks please bitmessage me the link.  Thanks.
+Note:  If there is a paper or proof showing the Bitmessage protocol is immune from man-in-the-middle attacks please bitmessage me the link.  Or better yet add it to this wiki.  Thanks.
 == Thoughts On Bitmessage ==
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-   message
+More junk.
-  [4][12][4][4][...]

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 The only solution I can see at the moment is a pre-shared encryption key that is used to initially establish the network in a secure fashion.  Any ideas on how to do this?  My initial thought was postcards or postal letters.
 ====Reference Test====
 Bob's Reference<ref>{{cite journal |arxiv=quant-ph/9508027 |title=Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer |first=Peter |last=Shor |journal=SIAM Journal on Computing |volume=26 |issue=5 |year=1997 |pages=1484–1509 }}</ref>
@@ Line 62: / Line 62: @@
 {{RefList}}
-[[User:0x20545446|0x20545446]] ([[User talk:0x20545446|talk]]) 14:44, 6 September 2013 (CDT)

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:03, 6 September 2013
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	<references />		<references />
		+	====Reference Test====
		+	Bob's Reference<ref>{{cite journal \|arxiv=quant-ph/9508027 \|title=Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer \|first=Peter \|last=Shor \|journal=SIAM Journal on Computing \|volume=26 \|issue=5 \|year=1997 \|pages=1484–1509 }}</ref>
		+
		+	{{RefList}}

	[[User:0x20545446\|0x20545446]] ([[User talk:0x20545446\|talk]]) 14:44, 6 September 2013 (CDT)		[[User:0x20545446\|0x20545446]] ([[User talk:0x20545446\|talk]]) 14:44, 6 September 2013 (CDT)

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-== Thoughts ==
+== About Me ==
-[[Protocol Goals]]
+Note:  If there is a paper or proof showing the Bitmessage protocol is immune from man-in-the-middle attacks please bitmessage me the link.  Thanks.
-[[Protocol
 === Protocol Goals ===
@@ Line 21: / Line 43: @@
 === Current Protocol Deficiencies ===
 * Published public keys can be compromised by man-in-the-middle attacks during backbone routing.
-** While P2P may be hard to intercept, The Guardian has reported that a P2P protocol/network will be or already is compromised. <ref name="a">Among the specific accomplishments for 2013, the NSA expects the program to obtain access to "data flowing through a hub for a major communications provider" and to a "major internet peer-to-peer voice and text communications system".; [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security]</ref>
+** While P2P may be hard to intercept, The Guardian has reported that a P2P protocol/network will be or already is
-<references />
+[[User:0x20545446|0x20545446]] ([[User talk:0x20545446|talk]]) 14:44, 6 September 2013 (CDT)

@@ Line 21: / Line 21: @@
 === Current Protocol Deficiencies ===
 * Published public keys can be compromised by man-in-the-middle attacks during backbone routing.
-** While P2P may be hard to intercept, The Guardian has reported that a P2P protocol/network will be or already is compromised.<ref name="a">Among the specific accomplishments for 2013, the NSA expects the program to obtain access to "data flowing through a hub for a major communications provider" and to a "major internet peer-to-peer voice and text communications system".; [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security]</ref>
+** While P2P may be hard to intercept, The Guardian has reported that a P2P protocol/network will be or already is compromised. <ref name="a">Among the specific accomplishments for 2013, the NSA expects the program to obtain access to "data flowing through a hub for a major communications provider" and to a "major internet peer-to-peer voice and text communications system".; [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security]</ref>
 <references />

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:57, 6 September 2013
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	[[Protocol Goals]]		[[Protocol Goals]]
		+	[[Protocol
		+
		+	=== Protocol Goals ===
		+	* Asynchronous, Queued, Batched Delivery
		+	* Delivery Confirmation
		+	* Anonymous, If Desired
		+	* Sending Address Non-Repudiation
		+	* Private to Receiving Address
		+
		+
		+
		+	=== Protocol's Assumed Operational Environment ===
		+	* All data packets are intercepted en-route from originating host to the terminating host.
		+	** Metadata about all data packets are captured and made available for real-time and historical analysis. This includes size, time, route, payload, etc.
		+	** All data packets subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. e.g. The originating host is not sure the packet sent is the one received by the terminating host. The terminating host is unsure of the true source of the data packet received.
		+	** All man-in-the-middle attacks may use significant amounts of captured metadata from previous transmissions across the entire internet and operate in real-time so as not to be detectable. e.g. Linking data packet through metadata relationships for point-to-point transmissions based on size, timing, content, source, destination, route, etc. This represents core routers collection and analyzing numerous bitmessage data streams in real-time.
		+
		+	=== Current Protocol Deficiencies ===
		+	* Published public keys can be compromised by man-in-the-middle attacks during backbone routing.
		+	** While P2P may be hard to intercept, The Guardian has reported that a P2P protocol/network will be or already is compromised.<ref name="a">Among the specific accomplishments for 2013, the NSA expects the program to obtain access to "data flowing through a hub for a major communications provider" and to a "major internet peer-to-peer voice and text communications system".; [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security]</ref>
		+
		+	<references />